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T H E  B E N E F I T S  O F  BA L A N C E
Credibility, the Rule of Law, and Investment in Latin America
Michael Touchton
Boise State University
Abstract: Research surrounding political institutions and credible commitment to the 
rule of law is integral to recent efforts to tie democracy to economic development. I 
identify the determinants of rule-of-law perceptions in Latin America and argue that 
constraining elected offi cials facilitates a commitment to democracy that makes govern-
ment policies credible. I also argue that aspects of politics leading to deadlock might have 
a hidden upside in generating policy credibility. I test my arguments against pooled 
cross-sectional, time series data for twenty Latin American countries between 1996 
and 2012. Ultimately, my research demonstrates the benefi ts of functioning checks and 
balances among elected offi cials for the rule of law and provides a uniform framework 
linking democratic inputs to legal and economic outcomes.
Latin American countries have had diffi culty committing to the rule of law. 
Scholars blame the (un)rule of law for low investment, slow economic growth, 
and stagnant or unequal political development (see Méndez O’Donnell; Pinheiro 
1999; North and Weingast 1989; De Soto 2003; O’Donnell 2001; Mainwaring and 
Scully 2010; Diamond 1999; Foweraker and Krznaric 2002; Haggard, MacIntyre, 
and Tiede 2008; Haggard and Tiede 2011). From an economic standpoint, govern-
ments’ abilities to commit credibly to policy regimes and the rule of law also al-
lows governments to commit to protecting property rights, enforcing contracts, 
and treating fi rms and investors equitably under the law.1 Investors are justifi ably 
reluctant to invest if a government cannot credibly guarantee that their invest-
ments will be safe from expropriation. Firms will not invest the extensive capital 
necessary to buy land or build a factory if they fear that the state will nationalize 
their investment once it becomes profi table (see Haber, Razo, and Maurer 2003; 
Hoff and Stiglitz 2002; North and Weingast 1989). Furthermore, investors will not 
keep their money in a given country if they fear that the government will tax 
profi ts at exorbitant rates. Investment capital therefore fl ows away from countries 
where profi ts are in jeopardy and toward countries where profi ts are safe from 
rapacious governments. Ultimately, markets fail to develop and growth suffers 
in countries where governments cannot make a credible commitment to uphold 
property rights and enforce contracts.
This manuscript was accepted for publication in September 2015. New data have become available on 
several key variables. The updated data set and Stata do-fi le for replication are available on the author’s 
website: http://sps.boisestate.edu/politicalscience/faculty/mike-touchton/.
1. Institutional economists have made a cottage industry from these assertions (see North and Wein-
gast 1989; De Soto 2003; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Glaeser et al. 2004; see also Coase 1960; Demsetz 
1967).
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There is considerable discussion of what the rule of law means, and some 
scholars argue that the term is so amorphous and contested that it has become 
meaningless (see Weingast 1997; Tamanaha 2004; Munck 2009). I use a thin eco-
nomic defi nition from Hoff and Stiglitz (2002) as a point of departure: for the pur-
poses of this study, the rule of law exists when a country features “well-defi ned 
and enforced property rights, broad access to those rights, and predictable rules 
for resolving property rights disputes” (1). Furthermore, “under the ‘rule of law,’ 
the ability of the local, regional, and national authorities to take arbitrary actions 
is circumscribed” (2). I add policy credibility to complete my defi nition: observers 
must be confi dent that agents of the state will implement and enforce legislation 
for the rule of law to exist.
I emphasize the economic aspects of the rule of law, but the concept is impor-
tant from a political standpoint as well. For instance, many scholars argue that 
the rule of law is part and parcel of consolidated democracy. Political institutions 
will not function as intended without the rule of law as a strong foundation. For 
example, elections will not be free or fair (O’Donnell 2004), political rights and 
civil liberties will not be enforced, and politicians who violate the law will not be 
held accountable (Diamond 1996; Maravall and Przeworski 2003; Weingast 1997) 
in the rule of law’s absence.
Growing evidence demonstrates the rule of law’s importance for political and 
economic development, yet we know relatively little about how the rule of law 
comes to exist in the fi rst place.2 There are many useful theoretical frameworks—
such as those in Weingast (1997), Maravall and Przeworski (2003), Méndez, 
O’Donnell, and Pinheiro (1999) and O’Donnell (2001, 2004)—but relatively few 
empirical tests of these arguments that incorporate differences across countries 
or changes over time within countries.3 I fi ll gaps in theoretical and empirical 
knowledge on the connections between political inputs and economic outcomes 
by taking a step back and identifying the determinants of perceptions of the rule 
of law in Latin America. My study is limited to a measure of perceived rule of 
law, but perceptions are important: investors make decisions on the basis of their 
perceptions, which may or may not refl ect all investors’ experience with govern-
ment. Investors face time constraints and barriers to collecting information on 
all property rights disputes or all contract law rulings. However, it is quick and 
therefore attractive to evaluate government credibility on the basis of general, 
rather than specifi c, political and economic analysis. I argue that the presence of 
opposition politicians in veto-player institutional positions increases the costs of 
altering policy and ultimately the credibility of a government’s policy commit-
ment. Second, I test my theoretical argument along with other popular theories 
against panel data encompassing twenty Latin American countries from 1996 to 
2012. Finally, I address the connection between perceptual governance measures 
2. Some exceptions are Acemoglu Johnson, and Robinson (2001), Woodberry (2012), Nunn (2008), and 
Charron (2009).
3. Chavez (2004) and Miller and Perito (2004) provide extensive arguments chronicling the rule of law 
in individual countries. Some recent cross-national efforts to study the rule of law include Haggard and 
Tiede (2011) and Touchton (2014, 2015).
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and investors’ actions by estimating a model of gross fi xed capital formation (fi xed 
investments) in Latin America using similar independent variables.
I limit my data set to Latin American countries for three central reasons. First, 
Latin American countries’ colonial origins are relatively similar to countries in 
other regions. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) show the relevance of co-
lonial origins for institutional performance and economic growth, but colonial 
origins can confound efforts to model the rule of law or investment using con-
temporary political variables. Limiting my study to Latin American countries lets 
me hold colonial origins relatively constant and avoid such barriers to appropri-
ate estimation. Second, Latin American countries have a longer history with de-
mocracy than countries in other developing regions. The longer experience with 
democracy allows for a potentially more appropriate test of democratic political 
arguments than elsewhere because Latin American countries have had a longer 
time to consolidate democracy following third-wave transitions than other re-
gions such as Africa or Southeast Asia.
The results of my analysis show that political and institutional constraints 
on elected offi cials have a statistically signifi cant impact on rule-of-law percep-
tions. Specifi cally, I argue that politicians are more likely to exercise veto author-
ity and protect the rule of law when they are not members of the majority party. 
Rather than only creating deadlocked situations, I contend that the inability to 
pass  policy-changing legislation has a hidden upside for commitment to a given 
policy regime in general and to perceptions of the rule of law in particular. Per-
ceptions of the rule of law improve as the ideological gap between politicians 
in different branches of government grows, even after controlling for factors 
thought to infl uence citizens’ ratings of the rule of law, such as the level of wealth 
within a country and the level of ethnolinguistic fractionalization. This result 
suggests that previous arguments surrounding the perils of polarization, such as 
those found in Linz (1994) or Ames (2009), may have been premature: the factors 
thought to undermine government policy by paralyzing the legislative process 
may be the same factors generating credible commitments to important policies 
in other  areas. My research thus provides a new direction for scholarship on poli-
tics, credibility, and economic development in Latin America.
THEORY
There is a broad consensus that perceptions of the rule of law infl uence both 
political and economic development (North and Weingast 1989; Weingast 1997; 
O’Donnell 2001, 2004; De Soto 2003; Maravall and Przeworski 2003). This begs an 
important question: What determines perceptions of the rule of law in the fi rst 
place? Previous research identifi es political institutions as relevant for the rule 
of law. For example, scholars identify electoral rules, regime type, interaction be-
tween branches of government, number of bottlenecks in the policy-making pro-
cess (veto points), and federalism as elements potentially bringing accountability 
to government and thus protecting private rights (Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman 
2005; Persson and Tabellini 2003; Lijphart 1999). Political institutions may be an 
important part of the explanation, but it can be diffi cult to disentangle myriad 
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 institutional elements and the endogeneity problems that their evolution gener-
ates (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001). Furthermore, institutional struc-
tures alone do not generate policy. Instead, individual politicians facing partisan 
pressure channel constituent interests through representative institutions. Ignor-
ing these agents’ roles as institutional gatekeepers renders previous research in-
complete. Institutions will not function as intended unless it is in the political 
interests of elected offi cials to exercise their authority and guarantee government 
respect for private rights. Both foreign and domestic investors key in on this area 
when assessing the rule of law because institutional talk is cheap: investors want 
to know not only whether institutions offer politicians the opportunity to con-
strain one another and protect investors’ rights but also whether politicians have 
the motive to do so as well.
Tsebelis (2002) provides the theoretical justifi cation for considering not only 
the structure of institutional checks and balances but also the preferences of poli-
ticians, and thus their incentives within those institutions. Tsebelis argues that 
three critical elements determine the importance of veto points that can derail pol-
icy change within institutions: the number of veto points, the coherence of opposi-
tion veto players, and the ideological distance between the veto players and the 
executive. Tsebelis discusses how these elements make de jure veto points fully 
operational: increasing the number of veto points and the ideological distance be-
tween veto players increases the diffi culty in altering policy from the status quo.
I argue that politicians must have incentives to exercise the checks and bal-
ances of their offi ces in order to credibly commit to the rule of law. Explanations 
focusing on constitutional structures, such as those in Persson and Tabellini 
(2003), describe only one part of the story on credibility; understanding the role 
of politicians within political institutions is essential to understanding credible 
commitment. Borrowing from Tsebelis’s (1995, 2002) and Brown, Touchton, and 
Whitford’s (2011) logic, I argue that pluralism among elected offi cials alters in-
vestors’ expectations of how political incentives infl uence executive-legislative 
relations and subsequent commitments to the rule of law. Politicians from par-
ties with similar policy preferences in the executive and legislative branches of 
government have few incentives to block one another’s policies because they are 
likely to share similar views on what makes for good policies in the fi rst place. 
Furthermore, politicians from parties with similar policy orientations are likely 
to work together in the future to enact their preferred policies. Thwarting one 
another in the present decreases the prospect for future collaboration to achieve 
mutually desirable goals because it erodes trust between parties and increases the 
risk of negative retaliation against future proposals. Politicians from parties with 
similar policy preferences therefore do not have incentives to prevent one another 
from violating the rule of law, which in turn renders checks and balances between 
the executive and legislature impotent when members of these parties occupy 
both branches of government. As a result I do not expect politicians from parties 
with similar policy preferences to exercise vetoes and block one another’s poli-
cies as frequently as would politicians with divergent preferences. It is important 
to note the probabilistic nature of my argument. I do not intend to suggest that 
there are no incentives for similar parties to block one another—only that incen-
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tives to block one another generally increase along with the ideological distance 
between parties. For instance, Mexico’s Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) 
and Partido Acción Nacional (PAN) may very well block one another, but I ex-
pect this to occur less often than for the PAN and the Partido Revolucionario 
Democrático (PRD).
Several empirical studies both directly and indirectly support my reasoning 
on institutions, their occupants, and credibility. Keefer and Stasavage (2003) ar-
gue that strong differences among the preferences of veto players in the govern-
ment bolster the institutions underpinning checks and balances: the greater the 
ideological distance between elected offi cials, the greater the impact that checks 
and balances have on policy outcomes. Stasavage (2002) identifi es the importance 
of partisan interests for generating commitments to repay state debt amid numer-
ous veto players. Frye (2002) showcases the role of agents within the court system 
as well as those enforcing bureaucratic regulations in securing property rights in 
Russia. Finally, Ugalde (2000) identifi es the dramatic improvement in oversight 
of the executive branch as ideological pluralism increases in Mexico’s legislature. 
The result is increased oversight through incentives to oppose rather than ap-
pease the executive branch and a break with the country’s institutional collusion 
of the past.
In general, policy credibility is the key factor in many analyses of what creates 
commitments to investors’ rights, including property rights and contract enforce-
ment (North 1990; North and Weingast 1989; Henisz 2000, 2002; Henisz and Zelner 
2007; Keefer 2004; Keefer and Knack 2002; Hicken, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2005; 
Andrews and Montinola 2004). In these studies (and many others) investors privi-
lege the government that can do relatively less harm, given political constraints, 
over the government that has the relative freedom to help but also to hinder in-
vestment. The incentives pushing politicians to work together or to oppose one 
another are therefore important for investors because they generate expectations 
about how democratic institutions actually work—not how they are supposed to 
work. I contend that investors witnessing politicians’ commitments to the rule of 
law assess the credibility of these commitments by determining whether politi-
cians have incentives to honor their promises. Simply put, investors deem com-
mitments to the rule of law more credible as politicians’ costs of reneging on these 
commitments increase. My logic here is not new—James Madison presented it in 
1788 in the Federalist Papers, No. 51—and Douglass North (1990), Barry Weingast 
(1997), and many others have argued for the utility of making unilateral policy 
change diffi cult. However, effective political constraints do not just prevent policy 
change: low policy volatility may benefi t investors in and of itself, but the pres-
ence of political constraints also brings accountability to governance. Opposition 
politicians have fewer incentives to collude in corrupt activities than do politi-
cians in the same party or those with a similar ideology. Furthermore, politicians 
have incentives to report corruption and hold the violators accountable if they 
represent another party or ideology. I contend that this argument is just as ap-
plicable for the rule of law as for corruption. This is not to say that politicians 
who disagree with one another always prefer to respect the rule of law—far from 
it. My argument is only that politicians who disagree have incentives to prevent 
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the passage of one another’s policies, including those that violate the rule of law. 
In turn, investors will deem the rule of law relatively more protected under such 
political confi gurations than in circumstances in which politicians lack similar 
incentives, all things being equal.
THE RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA
Purely structural aspects of political institutions thought to be relevant for eco-
nomic development—such as the constitutional separation of powers or checks 
and balances in Persson and Tabellini (2003), or the origin of a country’s legal 
system in La Porta, López-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and Djankov and col-
leagues (2002)—offer poor explanations for the wide variation in rule-of-law per-
ceptions across Latin America’s diverse political contexts. Many Latin American 
constitutions are quite similar to one another in terms of separate executive and 
legislative branches of government in a representative democratic framework, 
separate judiciaries, civil law legal systems, and some combination of propor-
tional representation and single-member-plurality rules translating votes into 
seats. Of course, there are also large, visible differences in the level of institutional 
performance in Latin America—dating to the colonial era in many countries—as 
discussed in Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001). Variation in rule-of-law 
scores effectively refl ects these differences in general institutional performance—
it would surprise no one to fi nd that broad measures of institutional quality are 
statistically connected to perceptions of the rule of law. In contrast, the relative 
ease or diffi culty with which elected policy makers can pass legislation varies 
from year to year and country to country in the sample, given the confi gurations 
of elected offi cials, their party allegiance, and their interests at a given time. These 
elements of democratic political life are not mirror images of the rule of law itself, 
and certainly not its components of property rights and contract enforcement. It 
is therefore possible and potentially fruitful to estimate the impact of political 
constraints on government on the rule of law.
Previous research has found that credible commitments arise from political 
institutions and constitutional rules that limit arbitrary power, bring accountabil-
ity to government, and constrain politicians’ behavior in wealthy democracies 
(North and Weingast 1989; Tsebelis 2002; Weingast 1997; Barro and Gordon 1983). 
Yet Latin American countries have adopted democratic constitutions and politi-
cal institutions similar in form to those in wealthy democracies with little suc-
cess; translated institutions and rules rarely function as advertised in these cases 
(Méndez, O’Donnell, and Pinheiro 1999; O’Donnell 2001). Illiberal democracies 
that have developed in the region have the trappings of democratic institutions 
but place no real limits on politicians’ power (Zakaria 2007). These countries imi-
tate the form of a credible government but miss out on the function: they treat citi-
zens inequitably under the law, continue to seize property, and confi scate invest-
ment profi ts rendering incredible any of their claims to support the rule of law.
Venezuela’s recent history illustrates how many Latin American institutions 
have liberal democratic forms but illiberal functions. For example, Venezuela’s 
constitution separates powers and endows each branch of government with the 
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theoretical ability to exercise checks and balances against the other branches. 
However, Hugo Chávez and his party, the Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela 
(PSUV), governed Venezuela without a strong, organized opposition among 
elected offi cials to constrain them in the early part of the twenty-fi rst century. 
The Chávez administration’s policies generated regular disputes over investors’ 
rights, and private-sector investment fl ed the country during his administration 
(Garay and González 2008; Stein 2011). PSUV members of the National Assembly 
were disinclined to challenge former president Hugo Chávez’s actions during his 
tenure because political advancement theoretically depended on pleasing him 
and his party, the PSUV, which dominated the institution. This dynamic contin-
ues under current president Nicolás Maduro. President Maduro’s policy commit-
ments, including any promises to the refrain from future violations of investors’ 
rights, are thus not credible, because few other elected offi cials in positions of 
veto authority have incentives to constrain him. But suppose we could remove 
members of President Maduro’s far-left PSUV from the National Assembly and 
repopulate the chamber with members of one of the parties opposed to Maduro’s 
policies, Un Nuevo Tiempo (UNT), whose policy preferences are center-left. This 
new National Assembly might be more likely to block Maduro’s far-left policies 
in some areas because of the UNT politicians’ centrist positions on many policy 
issues. Yet any new Venezuelan commitment to protect investors’ rights would 
only be somewhat more credible than under PSUV dominance of the presidency 
and the legislature, because members of the far-left PSUV and the center-left New 
Era coalition still agree fundamentally on many policies—potentially includ-
ing nationalization or high taxation of private property. Now suppose we could 
repopulate the National Assembly with the center-right, pro-business Primero 
Justicia (PJ) party that oppose all of Maduro’s preferences to nationalize private 
property.4 Investors might then be more confi dent that Venezuela’s institutional 
checks and balances would become operational. Venezuela’s commitment to the 
economics of the rule of law would be relatively more credible in this scenario 
because PJ members would have incentives to oppose Maduro. PJ politicians dis-
agree fundamentally with Maduro’s policies and would not likely work with him 
on future legislation. This party’s opposition to the executive’s policy preferences 
would thus send signals to investors that their rights would be more likely to be 
protected than under circumstances in which a single party governs the country 
or several ideologically similar parties occupy the National Assembly.
Left-leaning parties’ commitment to property rights and contract enforce-
ment may be entirely credible, but the parties may suffer from perceptual bias: 
many observers, especially investors, may simply trust right-wing parties’ com-
mitments to pro-business policies more. In this sense, a left-leaning party’s com-
mitment not to violate property rights would become more credible in investors’ 
eyes when politicians with incentives to oppose violations of property rights are 
present in offi ce. This refl ects James Madison’s sentiments in the Federalist No. 51, 
where “ambition must be made to counteract ambition” to achieve successful gov-
4. Venezuela’s opposition coalition, Mesa de la Unidad Democrática, had recently won a supermajor-
ity in the National Assembly as this article went to press.
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ernance. The Venezuelan example also shows how purely constitutional separa-
tion of powers and checks and balances alone do not generate credible commit-
ment to the rule of law. The investing public simply cannot trust the politicians in 
these institutions to constrain one another and protect investors’ rights when the 
majority belongs to the president’s party.
In this vein, I argue that investors are no fools and want to see evidence of 
government commitments to protect property rights and enforce contracts before 
they make investments. As a result, I hypothesize that investors gather informa-
tion on concrete events as opposed to more abstract concepts, such as the word-
ing of a constitutional clause, when evaluating institutional performance and a 
government’s policy commitments. For instance, investors want to know whether 
presidents actually veto legislation nationalizing private property rather than 
whether the constitution allows for a veto in the fi rst place. The political incen-
tives for politicians in the legislative and executive branches of government to 
constrain one another and countries’ experience with outcomes in this area thus 
indicate how well institutions actually work in practice. In this way, I capture the 
messiness of democratic politics by providing a realistic model of how visible out-
comes of democratic practice can make or break a commitment to the rule of law.
The messiness of democracy may cut both ways: it is entirely possible that the 
political confi gurations most conducive to policy stasis, and thus commitment, 
could generate political and economic diffi culties through deadlock. Deadlock is a 
dirty word in Latin American politics: scholars blame governments’ inability to 
pass legislation for all manner of ills, from economic stagnation to military coups, 
dictatorship, and the failure to consolidate democracy in the region (Cheibub 2002; 
Linz 1994; Ames 2009; Mainwaring 1993). Deadlock among elected offi cials, the 
story goes, paralyzes policy makers and renders the government incapable of re-
sponding to new challenges and opportunities. The result is ineffi cient, unwieldy 
governance that lags behind the market and undermines a country’s economic 
growth prospects. I have no quarrel with this view of deadlock but evaluate em-
pirically whether the institutional and political factors thought to increase the risk 
of deadlock by constraining elected offi cials and undermining cooperation might 
also generate benefi ts in other areas, such as commitment to property rights and 
contract enforcement.
The following section describes the variables and methodology I use to esti-
mate the infl uence of political institutions, their occupants, and socioeconomic 
variables on the rule of law in Latin America.
VARIABLES AND METHODOLOGY
I use a cross-national indicator from the World Bank’s (2015) Governance Mat-
ters database to measure the rule of law in Latin America.5 The measure refl ects 
aggregated responses to survey questions regarding country experts’ and risk 
analysts’ experience with contract enforcement, protection of property rights, le-
5. The World Bank’s World Governance Indicators data are available at http://info.worldbank.org/
governance/wgi/index.aspx#home.
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gal equality, the judicial system—even the police. The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators (WGI) project compiles material from thirty-one different surveys and 
polls, such as Afrobarometer, Freedom House, Gallup International, the US State 
Department, and so on (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón 1999; Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2012). The WGI then generates a variable, the rule of law, 
consisting of a weighted average for survey responses on property rights, con-
tract enforcement, legal equality, and prevalence of crime. The surveys result in 
an aggregate measure covering an average of 182 countries at two-year intervals 
between 1996 and 2002 and annually through 2014. The cross-national breadth, 
temporal depth, and sophistication of the measure demonstrate why the WGI 
 indicator is one of the most frequently employed governance measures world-
wide (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2007c). Rule-of-law scores range from 
–2.31 (no rule of law) to +2.36 (perfect rule of law) and are scaled to a zero mean 
and a constant standard deviation (SD) for each year of data.6 Scores vary dra-
matically from one region to the next. Europe has the highest mean score at 1.65 
while Africa has the lowest at –1.43. Latin America’s mean score is –0.61. Chile has 
the highest mean score in the region, at 1.26, while Haiti has the lowest at –1.48. 
There are 280 total observations among Latin American countries in the data set 
for this article.
Independent Variables: Political Constraints
My primary independent variable stems from Witold Henisz’s (2000) efforts to 
create a cross-national measure of political constraints on government. Henisz’s 
Political Constraint Index (POLCON) measures the extent to which any individ-
ual actor is limited in pursuing his or her preferred policies by the structure of 
a country’s political institutions and the inferred preferences of politicians oc-
cupying those institutions. The fi rst step in constructing the measure identifi es 
the number of purely institutional, de jure veto points in a country’s political sys-
tem. Specifi cally, Henisz uses the Polity database (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 
2002) to identify the number of independent branches of government (executive, 
lower and upper houses of a legislature, judiciary, and any subnational entities) 
with theoretical veto power over policy making in a given country.7 Then Henisz 
codes data on the political parties in the system and their distribution within 
an independent executive and the legislative branch of government. The next 
step is an assessment of the relative alignment of political parties represented 
by politicians in these branches. The level of political constraints increases with 
each de jure veto point whose majority inhabitants are not members of the execu-
tive’s political party. For example, a year in which a country features independent 
executive as well as lower and upper legislative chambers in complete political 
6. A full discussion of the World Governance Indicators and their critics includes Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi (2007a, 2007b, 2007c) and Kurtz and Shrank (2007a, 2007b).
7. Presidential systems, by construction, do have an additional de jure veto point compared to parlia-
mentary systems. However, this is of no concern for my data, because all the Latin American countries 
in my data set use presidential systems of government (with Haiti as a slight exception) and there is 
wide variation in POLCON scores among these countries.
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alignment  receives a score of 0. Removing the political alignment in one cham-
ber increases the constraint score for that country-year to 0.33, two chambers to 
0.66, and all three to 1 (indicating maximum political constraints). Finally, Henisz 
evaluates the relative concentration of parties in each branch of the legislature. 
He includes the relative heterogeneity of political parties represented in the leg-
islature in the measure because he deems policy change relatively more diffi cult 
when more interests must be satisfi ed in order to gain passage of any given leg-
islation. Greater legislative fractionalization thus increases the costs of legislative 
and executive action, which decreases its feasibility. Henisz multiplies the level of 
legislative fractionalization by the previous institutions and political alignment 
score to calculate the fi nal political constraints value. For instance, a country-year 
with an independent executive as well as lower and upper legislative chambers 
without alignment across them has an initial score of 1.0. A fractionalization score 
of 0.9 refl ects a very high probability that two randomly drawn legislators will 
represent different parties. Multiplying 1.0 by 0.90 gives a POLCON score of 0.90. 
The fi nal measure is coded by country-year and exhibits continuous values rang-
ing from 0 (least constrained) to 1 (most constrained). However, no country-year 
score exceeds 0.73 in the data. The mean score for Latin American countries in 
my data set is 0.31 and the standard deviation is 0.12. Chile has the highest mean 
score, at 0.54 (most constrained), and Cuba has the lowest mean score (least con-
strained), at 0.00. The mean score of the United States is 0.40.
Democracy
Democratization increases the number of veto players through political com-
petition, places institutional constraints on the chief executive, and increases citi-
zen participation through elections. Kunicová and Rose-Ackerman (2005) argue 
that participation, political competition, and constraints on the chief executive 
all increase accountability as the population is better able to monitor politicians 
and identify corruption. Competition in democracies also produces accountabil-
ity because it creates incentives for politicians to identify one another’s corrupt 
behavior. Additionally, democracy improves public goods provision relative to 
authoritarian governance. Olken (2008) and Keefer and Khemani (2005) argue 
that greater public goods provision refl ects greater cooperation and higher levels 
of the rule of law in democracies. I therefore evaluate whether relationships be-
tween democracy and the rule of law emulate those concerning corruption and 
the provision of public goods.
In contrast to democratic governments, authoritarian governments are likely 
to undermine the rule of law (Maravall and Przeworski 2003), as are illiberal de-
mocracies (Zakaria 2007). However, high economic growth under authoritarian 
regimes in some East Asian and a few Latin American countries suggests that 
these governments may have identifi ed ways to make credible commitments to 
property rights and contract enforcement without democratic constraints on au-
thority (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011; Montinola, Qian, and Weingast 1995; Knack 
and Keefer 1995; Barros 2003). Yet the countries in my data set receiving the least 
democratic scores on Freedom House’s (FH) Political Rights indicator (Cuba, 
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Haiti, Venezuela) are the ones exhibiting some of the lowest economic growth 
during the time frame my data set covers. This suggests that authoritarian gov-
ernments are in no way better suited to protect investors than their democratic 
counterparts—quite the opposite, judging by these examples. Still, the question of 
whether democratic practice maps onto the rule of law is worth revisiting in the 
Latin American context to assess how well democratic theory matches political 
realities in the region.
Contemporary Latin America features primarily democratic governments, al-
beit illiberal ones in many cases. There is therefore wide variation among the 
quality of democracy in Latin America, which I capture through the Freedom 
House (FH) political rights score. Freedom House assesses political rights in each 
country around the world by collecting data on its electoral process, its levels 
of political participation and pluralism, and how well its government functions. 
Freedom House (2013) ranks each country from 1 to 7 on the basis of expert re-
sponses to ten different questions. This is a widely used measure of de facto, 
rather than de jure, democracy and allows me to evaluate further my argument 
surrounding institutional function over form. The mean score for the countries 
in my data set is 3.6, with a standard deviation of 1.4. Cuba exhibits the high-
est mean score (least free), at 7.0, and Costa Rica and Uruguay exhibit the lowest 
mean scores (most free), at 1.0.
Party Orientation
The party orientation variable measures the ideological orientation of the chief 
executive’s party in each country and classifi es it as left, right, or center. The con-
ventional wisdom suggests that right-wing parties, with pro-business reputa-
tions in many cases, will enforce contracts in favor of the private sector more 
consistently and have greater respect for private property than left-wing parties 
to please their private-sector allies. For instance, many may believe that right-
wing parties will keep their promises on the economic aspects of the rule of law 
in order to support their business constituencies, whereas left-wing parties will 
not—even if the right-wing parties are no more credible than the left-wing parties 
in other areas. Furthermore, right-wing parties have a reputation for supporting 
law and order in general, at least from a rhetorical standpoint. The private sector’s 
presumed identifi cation of the rule of law with the political right implies that 
increasing political constraints on the executive, increasing the effectiveness of 
institutional checks and balances, or increasing the ideological distance between 
elected offi cials in different branches of government may improve perceived rule 
of law when pro-business, right-wing parties are in opposition but undermine 
it when the right is in power.
The prospect that the business community in Latin America systematically 
trusts right-wing governments with their property rights more than left-wing 
governments deserves further attention. I therefore include a variable for right-
wing governments in my statistical model to determine whether the conventional 
wisdom stands up to empirical scrutiny and to test whether the rule of law in-
creases when right-wing governments are in offi ce, all things being equal. I use 
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Keefer and Stasavage’s (2003) common measure of party orientation to examine 
this prospect. This indicator has been used extensively and is highly correlated 
with other measures of partisan policy orientation, such as those from Benoit 
and Laver (2006) (0.92) and the Comparative Manifesto Project (0.87) (Budge 2001; 
Klingemann et al. 2006). I recode the variable for ease of interpretation resulting 
in scores of 0, 1, or 2 to refl ect the party of the chief executive’s ideological posi-
tions as leftist, centrist, or right-wing. The mean is 0.61 and the standard deviation 
is 0.85. For 2012 Argentina and the Kirchner administration receive a score of 0, 
the Piñera administration in Chile receives a 1, and the Calderón administration 
in Mexico receives a 2.
Log of Per Capita Gross Domestic Product Adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity
I also estimate the relationship between the rule of law and a country’s wealth. 
A country’s relative wealth is a key alternative explanation connecting high-
functioning democracies with the rule of law, namely, that any connections be-
tween industrialized democracies and the rule of law only refl ect underlying 
links between these countries’ wealth and their support for property rights and 
contract enforcement. A country’s wealth could affect the rule of law, and vice 
versa, in several ways. For instance, previous research shows that low-income 
countries have a greater incidence of corruption than high-income countries 
(Treisman 2000). Bureaucrats in developing societies receive salaries that are suf-
fi ciently low to entice corrupt behavior. Low-income societies may also lack the 
institutions for detecting public malfeasance—thus, poorer countries tend to ex-
perience more corruption. In many ways, this variable helps test a broader mod-
ernization thesis that economic growth will improve the quality of institutions, 
governance, and democracy (Lipset 1959; Przeworski 2000; Boix 2011). I follow this 
scholarship and expect poorer countries to exhibit relatively lower rule-of-law 
scores than wealthier countries.
The variable I use records each state’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP), 
adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP), for each year in the database. These 
fi gures are in 2007 dollars and come from the World Bank’s (2015) World Develop-
ment Indicators.8
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization
Recent research has emphasized the negative infl uence of ethnic heterogeneity 
in fostering growth and cooperation in society and the rule of law. For example, 
Easterly and Levine (1997) tie ethnolinguistic fractionalization (EF) to slow eco-
nomic development, low income, and inequitable distribution of wealth. Campos, 
Saleh, and Kuzeyev (2011) connect high levels of ethnic fractionalization to low 
levels of economic growth (see also Schüler and Weisbrod 2010). Additionally, 
Habyarimana and colleagues (2007) describe how EF undermines the provision 
8. I take the base 10 log of each observation and transform the variable so that it conforms to assump-
tions of normality for use in my regression models.
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of public goods, La Porta and colleagues (1999) show how high EF is associated 
with low quality of governance, and Knack and Keefer (1997) tie EF to low social 
trust in many countries. Finally, Cerqueti, Coppier, and Piga (2012) identify a re-
lationship between high levels of fractionalization and high levels of corruption, 
and Touchton (2013) connects EF directly to perceived rule of law. In many cases, 
EF’s infl uence stems from the assertion that in-group and out-group members re-
ceive different treatment from public offi cials, private entrepreneurs, and society 
in general. It is not the law that governs the norms of behavior in such inter actions, 
but ethnic, religious, linguistic, and/or clan loyalties that undermine some and 
empower others depending on membership in an in-group or out-group for a 
given circumstance.
Ethnic fractionalization is also important to include as a control variable be-
cause perceptions of the rule of law probably do not only arise from the political 
institutions identifi ed in the literature as important. Instead, any factors that alter 
the public’s perceptions of governance are also likely to be relevant (Barro and 
Gordon 1983; Mauro 1995). From this perspective, aspects of ethnic diversity, lin-
guistic cleavages, and religious schisms may alter perceptions of the rule of law. I 
follow previous literature on the subject and expect countries with high levels of 
EF to exhibit low rule-of-law scores relative to countries with more ethnic homo-
geneity. I use Alesina and colleagues’ EF variable from their 2003 data set. Alesina 
and colleagues calculate the probability that two randomly selected individuals 
in a country belong to the same ethnic group. I use data from 2003; Roeder (2001) 
demonstrates that EF does not change quickly. The mean EF score for countries in 
my data set is 0.419 and the standard deviation is 0.16. Bolivia features the highest 
score, at 0.740, and Haiti, at 0.095, has the lowest.
Model Specifi cation and Estimation
I use a fi xed-effects model to estimate the relationship among political, eco-
nomic, and social variables and perceived rule of law in Latin America. I esti-
mate several models using different specifi cations and estimation techniques, but 
the primary model uses cross-sectional, time series regression with fi xed effects. 
 Table 1 presents the results of estimation using this technique, whereas the sec-
tion “Robustness Checks” describes the complementary models.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
My estimates provide evidence for a strong, positive, statistically signifi cant 
relationship between effective political constraints on authority and perceived 
rule of law. As hypothesized, high levels of political constraints are associated 
with high levels of the rule of law. I estimate that a 1.128 increase in rule-of-law 
scores follows a one-unit increase in political constraints scores. This increase is 
much larger than one could expect in reality because no country in my data set 
moves from a score of 0 to 1 in one year. The mean annual change in the data is 
0.06 and the SD of the change is 0.12. Many countries in the data set exhibit annual 
shifts beyond two SDs in a given year, but these years are the exception, not the 
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rule. The shifts in the variable POLCON that one could reasonably expect are then 
between 0.06 and 0.30. Corresponding estimated increases in rule of law scores 
are then only 0.08 for a mean POLCON shift, 0.24 for a one SD POLCON increase, 
and 0.39 for a two SD POLCON increase, holding all other variables constant at 
their means. An increase of two SDs in POLCON, indicating a large relative in-
crease in constraints on politicians, generates an estimated shift in rule-of-law 
scores approximately equivalent to moving from Paraguay, with a 2012 rule-of-
law score of –0.87, to Mexico, with a score of –0.56, in one year. This difference is 
important—Mexico consistently ranks ahead of Paraguay on other governance in-
dicators such as corruption, and on measures of state capacity and effi cacy (World 
Bank 2015).9 This example is illustrative but not exact; the predicted rule-of-law 
scores for these countries depend on estimates at the means of all of the indepen-
dent variables—Paraguay and Mexico vary on many dimensions other than the 
political institutions in place and the policy preferences of their elected offi cials. 
These estimates only suggest that, on average, shifts in a country’s political con-
straints in a given year are associated with changes in perceived rule of law from 
both statistical and practical standpoints. Furthermore, several seemingly small 
annual increases in political constraints could add up to large estimated changes 
in the rule of law over a time frame of two to fi ve years.
My results are similar to those of Andrews and Montinola (2004) in this area, 
only my data set allows me to test a wide variety of additional hypotheses over 
a much longer time frame. My results are also in line with previous scholarship 
on credible commitment and the rule of law with regard to the central role that 
constraints on authority play for credibility (North and Weingast 1989; Keefer 
and Stasavage 2003; Henisz 2000; Barro and Gordon 1983). However, my fi ndings 
run counter to the conventional wisdom among those who study Latin American 
politics that legislative deadlock results in predominantly negative economic and 
9. The mean standard error for the World Bank’s rule-of-law scores is 0.135.
Table 1 Fixed-effects estimates of political constraints and the rule of law 
in Latin America, 1996−2012 
Variable Coeffi cient (SE)
Political constraints 1.306 (0.014)** 
Per capita GDP, PPP (logged) 5.592 (0.015)**
Freedom House political rights score −0.117 (0.052)*
Party orientation 0.108 (0.047)*
Ethnic fractionalization −0.364 (0.012)**
Constant −0.916 (0.006)**
N
Observations
20
280
F 22.85
Prob. > F 0.00
R2 (overall) 0.65
Note: Standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
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political outcomes for countries (Linz 1994; Ames 2009; Cheibub 2002). My results 
are also the opposite of some scholarship (e.g., Frye 2002, 2010) maligning politi-
cal polarization in general. Deadlock may still undermine governments’ abilities 
to generate necessary reforms or take rapid action to resolve crises. Yet for my 
data set at least, effective constraints on policy making carry the silver lining of 
improving commitments to the rule of law.
The results of my estimation also provide evidence for other important argu-
ments. The Freedom House measure of political rights, serving as a proxy for 
practical experience with governance in several different areas, is also a positive 
determinant of perceived rule of law in my model, similar to the theoretical and 
empirical arguments in Diamond (1996, 1999), O’Donnell (2001, 2004), Olken (2008), 
Keefer and Khemani (2005), Maravall and Przeworski (2003), Zakaria (2007), Gehl-
bach and Keefer (2011), and Montinola, Qian, and Weingast (1995).10 A one-unit 
increase in the FH score, indicating a country becoming “less free,” results in 
an estimated decrease of 0.12 in the rule of law. This suggests that, on average, 
increases in democracy lead to improvements in the rule of law, even if some 
individual countries can make credible commitments to property rights outside 
of democratic boundaries, as in Chile under Pinochet (Barros 2003). Yet the mean 
shifts of FH scores are small: 0.35 per year, with an SD of 0.11. This means even a 
rare two-SD shift in the FH score does not generate as much of a change in rule 
of law scores as a mean POLCON shift. Furthermore, my results demonstrate that 
the partisan political orientation of policy makers also matters for assessments of 
the rule of law in Latin America: moving from a leftist to a right-wing president 
increases the rule of law by an estimated 0.22 points, controlling for other factors 
in the model. This is less than the impact of the mean POLCON change on the rule 
of law, but it does occur more frequently in the data than a two-SD change in the 
Freedom House score. I explore this relationship further and present the results of 
estimation using an interaction term pairing POLCON with the party orientation 
variable in table 1c of the online appendix.11 Estimates of the rule of law are high-
est for countries with low POLCON scores and right-wing presidents, followed 
by countries with high POLCON scores and right-wing presidents, countries 
with high POLCON scores and left-wing presidents, and then countries with low 
 POLCON scores and left-wing presidents. These results show a strong conditional 
infl uence of political constraints depending on whether a president is on the polit-
ical left versus the right. They suggest that those evaluating the rule of law prefer 
unconstrained right-wing presidents but constrained left-wing presidents.
Next, I fi nd that increases in GDP per capita (logged, PPP) also result in im-
proved rule-of-law scores. I estimate that a 1 percent change in GDP per capita 
leads to a 0.06 increase in rule-of-law scores. This estimate refl ects a powerful 
relationship between economic growth and the rule of law: a country beginning 
10. I also present a model using a country’s polity score, which measures different aspects of democ-
racy, perhaps more in keeping with my theoretical arguments than the Freedom House score in table 1b 
of the online appendix. Polity is a statistically signifi cant determinant of the rule of law, and the coef-
fi cients on the other variables change very little.
11. The appendix is available on my website, at http://sps.boisestate.edu/politicalscience/faculty/
mike-touchton/.
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from the mean GDP per capita of $6,165 and growing at a 3 percent rate over a 
decade could be expected to increase its rule-of-law score by 2.04, all else equal. 
Such a whopping increase represents the approximate equivalent of moving from 
Cuba (–0.64) to Chile (1.37). In terms of potential for improvements in the rule of 
law, GDP growth thus provides the greatest long-term opportunities of any vari-
able in my data set. The relationship between economic growth and the percep-
tion of rule of law offers powerful evidence in favor of modernization theory à la 
Lipset (1959), Przeworski (2000), and Boix (2011). A decade’s worth of sustained 
economic growth is relatively rare in Latin America, but my estimates imply that 
substantial improvements in rule-of-law perceptions would follow such growth 
if countries could achieve it.
Finally, greater ethnic fractionalization is associated with lower rule-of-law 
scores in all models, which is consistent with Easterly and Levine (1997), Knack 
and Keefer (1997), La Porta and colleagues (1999), Habyarimana and colleagues 
(2007), Campos, Saleh, and Kuzeyev (2011), and Touchton (2013). The coeffi cient 
for EF is large, but EF is stable and changes are rare. EF is commonly and pow-
erfully associated with the rule of law, but it changes so slowly as to be practi-
cally irrelevant in the short term compared to the other independent variables in 
some senses. Nevertheless, policies to mitigate the negative impact of EF on the 
rule of law could be fruitful and merit exploration in ethnically heterogeneous 
countries.
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
My fi rst robustness checks are technical. I estimate several different models 
of perceived rule of law to account for potential endogenous regressors. First, I 
supplement my fi xed-effects model with a similar fi xed-effects model but with 
a lagged dependent variable (table 1c in the online appendix). Then I present a 
dynamic panel model from Arellano and Bond (1988, 1991) of rule-of-law percep-
tions to account for endogeneity and relatively time-invariant rule-of-law scores 
(table 1d). Finally, I present estimates from another GMM model, but with tradi-
tional instruments rather than lags of the independent variables (table 1c). Co-
effi  cients for POLCON and GDP per capita are smaller in these models, but both 
variables remain statistically signifi cant in all of them and in the same direction 
as in the primary model. I include a full discussion of these models and diagnos-
tics associated with them in the online appendix.
My next robustness check is theoretical. In many ways, rule-of-law percep-
tions are conceptually similar to POLCON, my primary independent variable. 
Constrained government sends a signal that all actors will have a relatively 
harder time undermining existing laws, but constrained government may refl ect 
the rule of law and not act directly on the rule of law itself. Viewed in this light, 
effective political constraints do not infl uence the rule of law. Rather, they are the 
rule of law. It would therefore be surprising not to fi nd statistical connections be-
tween POLCON and perceived rule of law, even while accounting for potentially 
endogenous relationships through statistical techniques. However, if  political 
constraints are connected to perceived rule of law and rule-of-law perceptions 
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are connected to investment, then POLCON should also infl uence investment. 
Attempting to increase investment by constraining government and improving 
rule-of-law perceptions will not work if POLCON is unrelated to investment. A 
lack of connection here would also imply a gap between actual rule of law, which 
could still be very important for investment, and perceived rule of law, which 
would not be. I take steps to resolve this issue by estimating a fi xed-effects model 
of gross fi xed-capital formation (GFCF) in Latin America. Table 2 presents the re-
sults of estimation using GFCF, a proxy for fi xed investments from both domestic 
and international sources, as a dependent variable.12
The results in table 2 mirror those for the rule of law in table 1: increases in 
political constraints increase fi xed investment, as do right-wing governments, 
improvements in democracy, economic growth, and trade openness.13 High levels 
of ethnic fractionalization and low turnover of leaders are associated with lower 
investment levels, on average.
CONCLUSION
I account for one of the defi ning characteristics of politics to model the rule of 
law: political institutions and the policy preferences of elected offi cials in those 
institutions. Elected offi cials and their incentives represent a potential missing 
link between institutions and credibility: my results demonstrate how the inter-
12. These data come from the UN Statistical Commission’s National Accounts Database, at http://
unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/Introduction.asp. I use the base 10 log of the raw GFCF per capita (PPP) 
in my models, giving a mean of 3.79 and SD of 1.30.
13. The online appendix contains a description of the new covariates along with several additional 
models to account for endogenous regressors, as with the perceived rule-of-law variables. I present 
these models in tables 2a–d in that online appendix.
Table 2 Fixed-effects estimates of political constraints and gross fi xed capital 
formation (per capita, logged) in Latin America, 1996−2012 
Variable Coeffi cient (SE)
Political constraints 0.557 (0.015)** 
Change in global GDP (%) 0.392 (0.003)**
Freedom House political rights score −0.068 (0.017)**
Party orientation 0.156 (0.024)*
Ethnic fractionalization −0.217 (0.040)**
Leadership stability −0.034 (0.018)*
Trade openness 0.005 (0.002)*
Constant 0.219 (0.013)**
N 20
Observations 280
F 18.72
Prob. > F 0.00
R2 (overall) 0.51
Note: Standard errors are robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.
*p < .05; **p < .01.
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ests of politicians operating within well-defi ned institutional channels improve 
rule-of-law perceptions. These offi cials may still hinder government progress on 
a number of fronts, but my research suggests that the same institutional and po-
litical factors detrimentally limiting government in some areas may benefi t the 
public in other areas by increasing policy credibility.
These results hold important implications for both scholars and practition-
ers interested in promoting democracy and economic development. My fi ndings 
demonstrate the relevance of practical incentives for politicians to constrain one 
another’s behavior for economic development. Ultimately, politically and ideo-
logically opposed politicians deploying institutional checks on government 
improve rule-of-law perceptions and increase fi xed investments because these 
politicians have practical motives to exercise those checks and balances—not 
just constitutional opportunities to do so. Deadlock is not the only outcome con-
straining Latin American leaders: my results imply that fostering pluralism in 
government might provide the benefi ts of balance as well.
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